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TRENDS IN BRAZILIAN REGULATION OF BUSINESS*
KEITH S. ROSENN**
I. INTRODUCTION

Brazil is an extraordinarily legalistic country. Enormous efforts
are made to try to regulate most aspects of socio-economic relationships. Virtually all economic activity is subject to a substantial
amount of governmental regulation. A decade ago I described this
Brazilian abhorrence of a legal vacuum in the following terms:
Brazil has reams of
ity seemingly every
of life not found in
prohibited by law,

laws and decrees regulating with great specificaspect of Brazilian life, as well as some aspects
Brazil. It often appears that if something is not
it must be obligatory.'

There was some hyperbole to that statement ten years ago; there is less
today. New regulatory laws and decrees are continually being

churned from governmental printing presses with mind boggling rapidity.
No one really knows how many laws are in force in Brazil.
Instead of specifically repealing superannuated legislation, standard
practice is to include in new legislation an article declaring that all
laws inconsistent with this law are hereby revoked. The explanation
for this legislative modus operandi is simple: No one really knows
which laws conflict with the measure being enacted. Aliomar Baleeiro, when still a member of the Supreme Federal Tribunal, estimated the number of laws in force in Brazil at 65,000. The late Pontes
de Miranda, Brazil's most prolific jurist, lowered that estimate by
about one-third in posing the following rhetorical question to the

University of Brasilia Law School in 1980:
If you professors wish to perform a service for the young persons
who are preparing here for their juridical life, alert their con-

*This article has been adapted from a paper prepared for the Conference
BRAZIL, 1980-2000, at the Hotel Intercontinental, Rio de Janeiro, August 20-22,
1980, under the sponsorship of Global Political Assessment, a publication of Columbia University's Research Institute on International Change. The ideas expressed,
however, are solely those of the author. The author gratefully acknowledges helpful
comments on an earlier draft by Jofio Caio Goulart de Penteado and Anthony Gooch
and extends to them the customary absolution for any errors, which are solely the
responsibility of the author. Copyright Keith S. Rosenn.
*Professor of Law, University of Miami

1. Rosenn, The Jeito: Brazil's Institutional Bypass of the Formal Legal System
and Its Developmental Implications, 19 AM. J. CoMp. L. 514, 528 (1971).
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science to this absurdity: how can one 2understand the law of a
country which has 45,000 laws in force?
A recent editorial by one of Brazil's leading newspapers summed
up the chaotic state of Brazil's legal system in these terms:
Since it is impossible to know our law, given the excess of legal texts
theoretically in circulation, new laws have been made on the supposition that they will affect areas still unregulated. The result is
that there are laws which in part repeat themselves, laws which
contradict themselves, and laws which result from pure speculation
without contact with social reality. Consequently, these laws have
only formal validity, remaining, as Miguel Reale has said, "in the
limbo of normativity." Problems arise; one makes new laws designed to solve them. But these laws are not applied and the problems continue and worsen. The Brazilian becomes ensnarled in this
normative mess, therefore, in which he becomes immobilized and
loses hope, be he a public servant or merchant, a handyman or
industrialist. This is because when he least expects it, a bureaucrat
pulls from his desk a legal provision, as if it were a gun, and shoots
the citizen who wishes to engage in any kind of productive activity.3

The image of bureaucrats firing legal missiles to kill productive activity is most apt. No one really knows how much government regulation
reduces Gross National Product, nor how much inflation is attributable to maintaining Brazil's huge bureaucracy and absorbing the costs

of bureaucratic bungling, but both figures are surely strikingly high.
It is not simply the huge number of laws in force that generates
confusion, but also the poor quality of so many laws and regulations.
All too often new Brazilian legislation overlaps with existing legislation and is dreadfully drafted. Rarely can one understand a new
measure without simultaneously looking at a number of prior statutes
and decrees. Then, one must await clarifying decrees and regulations
to find out what a new law really means. Even then one is never sure,
for typical practice in drafting regulations is to repeat verbatim or
paraphrase the words of the statute. Tax laws, which can be issued by
executive decree, tend to suffer more than most legislation from hasty

draftsmanship and inadequate conceptualization.
For example, as part of its increasing efforts to contain inflation
and to expand its monetary reserves, the government recently decided
to raise the rates on the Tax on Financial Transactions (IOF: Imposto
2. Quoted in the Jornal do Brasil, May 27, 1980, at 10, cols. 1-2.
3. "Olimpztda Legislativa," Jornal do Brasil, May 27, 1980, at 10, col. 1.
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sobre Operaiges Financeiras) and to expand its scope. Without any
public discussion or even notice, the government simply issued a
decree-law tripling the tax rate on most credit transactions. 4 This
decree-law also doubled the IOF rate on insurance premiums, imposed a 10% tax on purchase of securities on credit, and effectively
produced a partial, unannounced devaluation by imposing a 15%
(subsequently increased to 25 % by Decree-Law No. 1,844 of December 30, 1980) tax on the purchase of foreign exchange to cover imports. This dramatic boost in tax rates, the expansion of the types of
taxable transactions, and the failure to provide for any exemptions
produced a huge outcry from affected interests. Great uncertainty
also prevailed as to the tax basis. Was the revamped IOF to be
calculated solely on the principal amount, or were financing costs and
monetary correction to be included in the tax base? The Central
Bank, which is charged with administering the IOF, quickly began
issuing a series of resolutions and circulars "clarifying" the scope of the
IOF and creating exceptions. 5 Some of these measures merely modified a prior clarification. The life of this series of resolutions and
circulars was extraordinarily short. All were revoked by Central Bank
Resolution No. 619 of May 29, 1980, which contains forty pages of
detailed regulations completely reformulating the IOF. These reformulated regulations, which contain a long list of exemptions, are unnecessarily complex and difficult to understand, particularly since many
rules require the reader to refer to prior Central Bank rules. In addition to these drafting and conceptualization problems, the reformulation of the IOF has another serious defect. Its application to 1980
transactions violates the constitutional precept against retroactivity, a
conclusion recently reached by the Federal Appellate Tribunal (TFR)
sitting en banc.6

Since 1964 the bulk of all legislation has been initiated by the
Executive. A recent study made by Jos6 Costa, a federal Congressman, concluded that betveen March 1964 and November 1979 the
Executive promulgated 1,756 decree-laws and 30,370 decrees, while
the Congress approved only 3,631 laws. Focusing on the most authori-

4. Decree-Law No. 1,783 of Apr. 18, 1980. The tax's name was also changed to
the Tax on Credit, Foreign Exchange, Insurance, and Securities Transactions (Imposto sobre Operag6es de Cr~dito, Cambio e Seguro e Normas Relativas a Titulos e
Val6res Mobiliirios), but the abbreviation IOF has been retained.
5. Cent. Bank Res. No. 610 of Apr. 18, 1980; Cent. Bank Res. No. 612 of May
8, 1980; Cent. Bank Circ. No. 523 of Apr. 23, 1980; Cent. Bank Circ. No. 525 of
Apr. 30, 1980; and Cent. Bank Circ. No. 530 of May 8, 1980.
6. Agravo em Mandado de Seguranga No. 91.332-S.P.
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tarian period, the decade between 1965 and 1975, Jos6 Costa discovered that 73% of the 1,743 laws passed by Congress were drafted by
the Executive. 7 Some of the legislation enacted since 1964 has been
highly imaginative and has worked well in resolving perceived problems. On the other hand, much has been poorly drafted, in part
because economists and engineers did much of the drafting. However,
a more fundamental reason better explains the technical deficiencies
of so much of the legislation of the post-1964 period. A serious cost of
the 1967 Constitution's allocation of enormous law-making powers to
the Executive and its administrative agencies is that laws are placed
on the statute books without sufficient empirical research and feedback from those affected to permit elimination of most of the kinks
prior to promulgation.
II.

BRAZIL's REGULATORY STYLE

Businessmen accustomed to operating in North America and
Western Europe occasionally suffer a severe case of the cultural bends
when suddenly submerged in Brazilian regulatory waters. Two basic
assumptions, namely that the legal system operates evenhandedly and
that those administering it subscribe to the notion that all people are
equal before the law, are somewhat attenuated in Brazil. For such
assumptions to be tenable, governmental institutions have to operate
within reasonably well defined limits. Citizens must be given advance
knowledge of their rights and duties and must have meaningful remedies against arbitrary exercise of administrative discretion. Despite
considerable improvement in recent years, these preconditions prevail
only to a limited extent today in Brazil.
One reason for their absence is that many governmental agencies
operate with exceedingly broad delegations of legislative power that
invite arbitrary or unprincipled actions. The legal norm is often only
the starting point for negotiations that produce ad hoc solutions.
Knowing the law is ordinarily not nearly as important as knowing the
policy of a given regulatory agency, and, more importantly, knowing
how to convince that agency to accord favorable treatment to your
case.
A second reason is that it is extraordinarily difficult in Brazil to
know which legal rules are in force. A bewildering variety of laws,
decree-laws, conventions, complementation agreements, decrees, regulations, ordinances, portarias, normative opinions, circulars, and
instructions are regularly published in the Didrio Oficial, an official
7. Reported in the Jornal do Brasil, May 25, 1980, at 7, 1st Caderno.
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gazette. Unfortunately, the Didrio Oficial is unindexed, undigested,
and cluttered with much trivia. There is no official recodification
integrating the myriad legal rules on given subjects, even at the federal level. There are a few privately published loose-leaf services, but
these are not comprehensive and the indexing is unreliable. Finding a
relevant law or decree frequently depends upon luck or access to a
privately prepared index or newspaper clipping collection.
Even more disconcerting is that some government agencies occasionally operate on the basis of unpublished rules. Thus the Central
Bank, which must register all foreign investment and loans in order
for dividends and interest to be remitted abroad, routinely refuses to
register certain kinds of foreign currency loans, but the prospective
borrower or lender will search the statute books in vain for the Bank's
policy. Incredibly, the foreign loan restrictions are literally off the
wall. On November 13, 1978, the Central Bank's Department of
Supervision and Registration of Foreign Capital (FIRCE: Departa-

mento de Fiscalizaqdo e Registro de Capitais Estrangeiros) simply
affixed an unsigned notice to its wall stating that it would thereafter
register only new foreign currency loans with a minimum term of
eight years and a grace period of thirty months."
Brazilian regulatory agencies also occasionally slow down or

refuse to process legitimate requests altogether when they deem such a
policy to be in the public interest. Institution of such a policy usually
has no legislative blessing, nor is it announced to the public. For
example, the Foreign Commerce Board of the Bank of Brazil (CACEX: Carteira do Com~rcio Exterior do Banco do Brasil S.A.) from
time to time holds up requests for import licenses to aid the country's
balance of payments situation. CACEX is also reputed to have a secret
list of goods that may not be imported under any circumstances. One

concludes that a product is on the list only after repeated requests for
an import license are refused or deferred without rational explanation.9
A third reason for this seemingly unlimited regulation is that
certain government agencies make themselves parties to contractual
negotiations between private parties. The government operates on the
paternalistic premise (not always well-founded) that foreign firms
have greater bargaining power and that governmental intervention is

necessary to redress the balance. Once a foreign lender and Brazilian
borrower have agreed upon the terms of a loan, the Central Bank
8. For a recent report on the continually shifting rules governing foreign loans,
see Skola, Foreign Loans in Brazil: Theory and Practice, 15 INT'L LAW. 73 (1981).
9. Bus. LAT. AM., July 16, 1980, at 226-27.
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reviews the transaction to make sure that the interest rate and commissions are not excessive and that the conditions of repayment are as
favorable to the borrower as possible. Brazilian firms signing licensing
or technical assistance agreements with foreign firms must have their
contracts approved by the National Institute on Industrial Property
(INPI: Instituto Nacional da Propriedade Industrial) and registered
with the Central Bank in order to remit royalty payments in foreign
currency. INPI commonly insists upon renegotiation of contract provisions to make them more favorable to the Brazilian contracting
party. Though both INPI and the Central Bank have published some
of the criteria they use in deciding whether to approve foreign loans
and technology transfer agreements, it is hard to predict in advance
what action either agency is likely to take.
A fourth factor is that government agencies feel free to disappoint
legitimate expectations by changing the rules of the game in midstream. Important modifications of the rules of the game are regularly
sprung on the public with little or no notice and often with retroactive
effect. For example, after lulling the business community into the
belief that the exchange rate policy of mini-devaluations would be
maintained by repeatly denying the rumor of a maxi-devaluation, on
December 7, 1979, the government devalued the cruzeiro by 30 %.
Some borrowers of foreign currency were badly burned. Others
clearly had advance notice, for Resolution 432 deposits, which shifted
the exchange risk to the Central Bank, surged sharply shortly before
the devaluation.' 0 Yet even those who correctly anticipated the devaluation were hurt because the Central Bank also unexpectedly froze
the bulk of Resolution 432 deposits for the life of the loan. While
deposits made by borrowers under Resolution No. 63 (cruzeiro repass
loans from Brazilian banks) may be liberated after 180 days, the bulk
of Resolution 432 deposits can be liberated only if converted to equity
investment or invested in projects deemed of high priority by the
Central Bank. 1" In this fashion the Central Bank produced a de facto
confiscation of many borrowers' rights to use the proceeds of their
loans.

10. Under the scheme established by Cent. Bank Res. No. 432 and Circ. No. 349
of June 23, 1977, firms with foreign loan obligations can reduce their exchange risk
exposure by purchasing and depositing foreign exchange with authorized banks.
These deposits bear interest at the rate fixed in the loan agreement. The withholding
tax burden is assumed, though not necessarily paid, by the Central Bank. A borrower
used to be able to use Res. 432 deposits at any time so long as 30 days had elapsed
since the last deposit or withdrawal.
11. Cent. Bank Res. No. 589 of Dec. 7, 1979.
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Perhaps an even more blatant recent example of changing the
rules on investors and savers in midstream occurred in April 1980, just
after the 1979 tax returns were due, when the government retroactively imposed a compulsory loan on 1979 tax-exempt income. As
originally enacted, the compulsory loan was set at 10 % of the individual's. 1979 nontaxable (or taxed exclusively at the source) income in
excess of Cr$ 4,000,000 (then about U.S. $77,500).12 Although this
exaction had all the earmarks of a loan (repayable in full starting in
July 1982 at 6% annual interest), it was actually a disguised tax on
capital gains and unearned income. 13
The compulsory loan generated vast amounts of criticism. Many
objected to its sneaky timing. Others complained that retroactive
taxation of exempt monetary correction and stock dividends resulting
from mandatory capitalization of a firm's fixed assets amounted to a
breach of good faith. The Brazilian Lawyers Institute prepared an
extensive study concluding that the statute was unconstitutional.
Some lawyers also expressed the opinion that the statute conflicted
with the National Taxation Code. Just as the regulations for this
statute were to have been issued, the government instead promulgated
Decree-Law No. 1,790 of June 9, 1980, which revamped the compulsory loan to make it more palatable. The new law permitted monetary correction of the loan plus 3% annual interest and imposed a
maximum limit on the loan of 3 % of the lender's net worth. Judicial
review of this statute appears to have been blocked by the threat of a
thorough tax audit for any taxpayer contesting the law's constitutionality in court.
For a good many years the government has manipulated the
computation of monetary correction on its Readjustable Treasury
Bonds (ORTN: Obrigaq6es Reajustiveis do Tesouro Nacional). The
inflation adjustment was originally based upon the percentage change
in the wholesale price index between the present and prior quarters,
with a three-month lag. Without bothering to enact new legislation,
the government from time to time has purged acts of God and acts of
Arabs from the wholesale price index used to derive the adjustment
coefficient; it has also altered the formula used to calculate the adjustment several times to lower the rate of return.' 4 On January 16,
1980, with no advance warning, the National Monetary Council
12. Decree-Law No. 1,782 of Apr. 16, 1980.
13. With an annual inflation rate running at approximately 100 %, repayment of
the principal without monetary correction is economically indistinguishable from a
tax with an effective rate of about 75% of the face amount of the "loan."
14. Roe, Finance, Rules and the Indexation of Brazilian Government Bonds, 12
VAND.

J.

TRANSNAT'L

L. 1 (1979).
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abandoned the concept of ex post monetary correction by deciding to
readjust ORTNs two months in advance in accordance with a presumed rate of inflation. This rate was fixed by the National Monetary
Council at 45 % for calendar year 1980 and was subsequently upped
to 50% on a June-to-June basis. Nonetheless, the presumed rate of
inflation still under-estimated the actual rate of inflation by approximately one-half. Since Brazilian law requires virtually all monetary
correction be linked to the ORTN readjustment rate, 5 the interest
rate on all indexed obligations and savings deposits turned sharply
negative. Brazil thus turned monetary correction into an inflation
control device that sharply disappointed the legitimate expectations of
bondholders, depositors, and other creditors. Curiously, this flagrant
impairment of the obligation of contracts failed to produce much
public outcry in Brazil, perhaps because Brazilians are so accustomed
to governmental tinkering with the rules of the game. As one would
expect, Brazilians did respond, however, by shifting their resources
out of indexed deposits and obligations, producing a sharp drop in the
savings rate. In November 1980 the government suddenly reversed its
policy and resumed ex post indexation. ORTNs are now fully indexed
to the percentage change in the national consumer price index.16
A fifth factor is Brazil's huge and astoundingly inefficient bureaucracy. Many departments are open only a few hours each day.
Governmental forms often must be purchased at places distant from
where they are to be filed. Payment of fees normally must be made at
commercial banks and subsequently presented to the processing
agency. Businesses are compelled to resort to the services of despachantes, official red tape cutters, in order to move all the necessary
pieces of paper through the bureaucracy any time they need a license
17
or authorization.
The volume of paper that must be moved through the labyrinthine bureaucracy in order to secure licenses or authorizations is astronomical. Even though the government has streamlined the process
somewhat as part of its energetic campaign to stimulate exports,
securing an export license still involves 1,470 separate legal actions
with 13 government ministries and 50 agencies.' 8 Even so simple an
act as registering to vote may take weeks to secure the approvals of a
dozen different governmental agencies and to prove that one has been
15. Law No. 6,423 of Je. 17, 1977.
16. Bus. LAT. Am., Nov. 12, 1980, at 361.
17. The despachante is more fully described in Rosenn, supra note 1, at 536-37.
18. Freed, "Brazil Bureau Is Battling Bureaucracy," Miami Herald, May 15,

1981, p. 9c, cols. 3-6.
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registered to vote in every previous place of residence. Moreover,
oftentimes an approval from one government agency expires before all
of the other necessary documentation is in order, requiring one to
begin the process anew.'
There is a decided tendency in Brazil to deal with any new
problem by creating a new agency to deal with it. The proliferation of
governmental agencies in the past few decades is truly astonishing.
Each agency accumulates staff and soon acquires a vested interest in
maintaining, if not enlarging, its own area of supervision. It is not
uncommon for the jurisdiction of a new agency to overlap with that of
an existing agency. Each agency is a law unto itself, and one sometimes vetoes permissions or projects approved by another.
For the past forty years governments have made a series of efforts
to reform. In July 1979 the government acknowledged that Brazil's
bloated, foot-dragging public administration had become a significant problem. The government decided to deal with this problem in
characteristic Brazilian fashion by creating a special Ministry for
Debureaucratization. Headed by Helio Beltrdo, former Minister of
Planning, this new agency has thus far issued a series of sensible
decrees simplifying several bureaucratic procedures. 20 Unfortunately, the bureaucracy has also dealt with the Ministry of Debureaucratization in typical Brazilian fashion by ignoring many of its debureaucratization measures. Reacting to numerous complaints about the
bureaucracy's disregard of debureaucratization measures, Beltrao rebureaucracy to take the Ministry
cently issued a decree requiring the
2
of Debureaucratization seriously. '
The costs to Brazil of this regulatory style are quite high. The
difficulty in knowing the rules of the game, coupled with frequent
midstream changes, produce considerable insecurity among investors
and businessmen. For private capital to play an important role in
Brazil's economic development, investors and businessmen must feel
19. Id.
20. E.g., Decree No. 84,541 of Mar. 11, 1980 (simplifying the process of obtaining a passport and abolishing the exit visa requirement for Brazilians traveling
abroad); Decree No. 84,451 of Jan. 31, 1980 (validating photocopies of notarial acts
or civil registries performed by Brazilian consuls); Decree No. 83,936 of Sept. 6, 1979
(eliminating five documents from list of prerequisites for federal government permissions).
21. Decree No. 84,585 of Mar. 24, 1980, provides that all requests for information by the Ministry of Debureaucratization must receive priority, that the general
public be allowed to complain directly to the noncomplying agency, and that an
offending agency modify its procedures to comply with the new debureaucratization
measures.
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not only that they can understand and work within the system, but
they can also rely on the ground rules remaining stable. The vital role
of the legal system in providing the security and foreseeability necessary for capitalist development was pointed out many years ago in the
economic sociology of Max Weber. "[T]he rationalization and systematization of the law in general and. . . the increasing foreseeability of
the functioning of the legal process in particular, constituted one of
the most important conditions for the existence of . . . capitalistic

enterprise, which cannot do without legal security." 22 All too often
the necessary degree of predictability is absent in Brazil. This flexible
and cumbersome style of regulation enormously increases the transaction costs of doing business in Brazil. Part of these costs stems from
additional fees for lawyers and despachantes. Part results from the
income lost while investment projects are delayed as negotiations
proceed before government agencies. Indeed, some worthwhile projects are abandoned because of the difficulty in obtaining simultaneously all the necessary governmental permissions. Some funds that
would otherwise have been invested in Brazil flee the country or never
enter. In addition, this regulatory style impedes legitimate regulatory
activities. With good reason Brazilians insist upon using bearer shares,
but how can one regulate abuses of "insider trading" with bearer
shares?
Excessive governmental regulation also contributes to the growth
of state capitalism, The most common reason given for chartering a
state company to undertake a given investment is that private capital
is not available for the task. Yet private capital is often unavailable
because freewheeling governmental regulation has generated unacceptable risks. By this analogue to the self-fulfilling prophecy, bureaucracy begets more bureaucracy.
The costs to Brazil would be even higher were it not for the
important paralegal institution of the jeito,2 3 a characteristic technique for bending legal rules to expediency. Much constructive and
productive economic activity has been accomplished because Brazilian bureaucrats have allowed the eieto to circumvent legal and administrative hangups. Indeed, without this felicitous Brazilian tendency

to bend the rules or reinterpret them in the light of good sense, the
wheels of the economy would have ground to a halt long ago.
Nevertheless, the Brazilian regulatory style is not conducive to
efficient decision making. Nor is it a style compatible with a modern,
22. M. WER, 2 ECONOMY AND SocIEry 883 (G.Roth & R. Wittich eds. 1968).
23. See Rosenn, supra note 1.
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developed industrialized society. Though Brazil has made great strides
towards becoming a modern, developed nation, it has yet to jettison
this ad hoc regulatory style and substitute rule for discretion.
The government has recently taken two significant steps towards
reducing the high social and economic costs of its regulatory processes:
(1) the December 7 Pacote (discussed below) and (2) the debureaucratization campaign. Unfortunately, there has been no significant
follow-up to the former, and it is doubtful whether the incipient
debureaucratization campaign will do much more than scratch the
surface in reducing these high costs. Administrative reform has been
tried often in Brazil, but the bureaucracy has a formidable track
record of successful resistance. Perhaps more importantly, the government continues to pass legislation granting vast amounts of discretion
to executive agencies with virtually no guidelines for its exercise.
III.

CURRENT TRENDS IN GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION OF BUSINESS

According to Delfim Neto, the present economic czar, Brazil's
long range goal is to return to a free market economy.24 Similar
statements have been strewn all along Brazil's path towards state
capitalism. Nevertheless, a significant step along the path toward a
free market economy was taken on December 7, 1979, when the
government closed down all foreign exchange operations and enacted
a series of reforms designed to deal with the interrelated problems of
inflation, burgeoning foreign debt, and the balance of payments deficit. These measures also reflect the spirit of debureaucratization; a
number are designed to eliminate governmental controls and subsidies
and to restore a greater semblance of the free market. The reform
package is summarized below.

24. In a recent speech given in Argentina, Planning Minister Delfim Neto stated:
Basically, Brazil wants to reach its development in the frame of a politically open society, with full awareness that this demands the existence of a

highly important private sector.
To express this aspiration implies expressing that we have to lean heavily
on a market economy. In other words, that within a lapse which cannot be
calculated, we shall return fully to a market economy. We really believe
that this is the most effective means for the utilization of our resources...
Hence, it must be borne in mind that, on the long term, we shall open our
economy.
Translated in MINISTRY OF ECONOMY, COORDINATION AND ECONOMIC PLANNING
SECRETARIAT, 107 ECONOMIC INFORMATION ON ARGENTINA, 11-12 (1980).
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The December 7 Pacote
1. Maxi-devaluation. The cruzeiro was devalued by 30 percent to
stimulate exports and discourage imports. Though the government
announced that it intended to follow an exchange rate policy of
mini-devaluations from time to time to correct the differential between Brazil's internal inflation rate and that experienced by its principal trading partners, during 1980 the rate of devaluation was only
about half the inflation rate.
2. Increase in Rebate on Income Tax on Interest Remitted
Abroad. In 1975 the Brazilian Central Bank instituted a policy designed to reduce the effective interest cost of foreign loans to certain
Brazilian borrowers by rebating to borrowers 85 % of the 25 % withholding tax imposed on interest payments by the Brazilian Income
Tax. On July 26, 1979, the Central Bank sought to discourage foreign
borrowing by reducing this rebate from 85% to 50%. The Central
Bank later decided to stimulate foreign loans by increasing the tax
rebate from 50% to 95% .25 Because of complaints by U.S. banks of
unfair competition, stemming from an I.R.S. ruling restricting the
foreign tax credit available to U.S. lenders to only that portion of the
withholding tax not rebated to the Brazilian borrower, 2 the Central
Bank in May 1980 decided to reduce the portion of the tax rebated to
the borrower from 95% to 40% .27
3. Demise of the Import Deposit. The requirement that importers make a cruzeiro deposit for 360 days of 100% of the FOB
value of the imported goods was eliminated as of December 10,
1979.28 The purpose of this reform was to eliminate a bureaucratic
labyrinth, especially for those seeking exemptions, and to mitigate the
30% increase in import prices resulting from the maxidevaluation.
4. Demise of the International Travel Deposit. The Cr$22,000
deposit which those traveling abroad had to leave for a year without
interest or monetary correction was also eliminated as of December
2
10, 1979. 9
5. Elimination of Freeze on Proceeds of Foreign Loans. Central
Bank Resolutions Nos. 532 and 553, which imposed a freeze on 50 %
25. Cent. Bank Res. No. 587 and Circular No. 479 of Dec. 7, 1979.
26. Rev. Rul. 78-258 (1978).
27. Cent. Bank Res. No. 613 of May 8, 1980.
28. Cent. Bank Res. No. 584 of Dec. 7, 1979. This resolution states that the
deposit is eliminated as of Jan. 1, 1980, but this date is erroneous. CACEX in fact
abolished the deposit as of Dec. 10, 1979.
29. Cent. Bank Res. No. 585 of Dec. 7, 1979.
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of the value of the proceeds of foreign loans, were revoked. 30 The
freeze provisions on the other half of the loan were made less onerous
in January 1980. On foreign private sector loans, one-fourth of the
cruzeiro equivalent is released to the borrower immediately. The
remaining 75% is deposited with the Central Bank, which assumes
the exchange risk and service obligations. One-third of this deposited
amount is released after 60 days, one-third is released after 90 days,
and the balance after 120 days. 3 '
6. Establishment of an Export Tax. Concern that the 30 % devaluation may cause detrimental reductions in the prices for exports of
primary products has led to the imposition of a 30 % export tax on
certain products, based upon a table of minimum values. 32 (This tax
has already been eliminated or is being phased out on several products.)
7. Restructuring Credit Subsidies. The government decided to
reduce the budgetary burden of huge amounts of subsidized credit, as
well as to avoid having the amount of subsidy increase directly with
the inflation rate. With the exception of special programs under the
Superintendency for the Development of the Amazon (SUDAM: Superintendancia do Desenvolvimento da Amazbnia) and Superintendency for the Development of the Northeast (SUDENE: Superintend~neia do Desenvolvimento do Nordeste), the miniumum rate for
subsidized governmental credit has been set at 40% of the monetary
correction rate plus a fixed interest charge. Exporters can receive
financing at 40% of the monetary correction rate plus 2% annual
33
interest.
8. Elimination of IPI Subsidiesfor Exports. Exemptions from the
Tax on Industrialized Products (IPI: Imposto sobre Produtos Industrializados) for exports have been eliminated. The 30 % devaluation
was deemed more than ample to replace these exemptions, which
were producing dumping charges by other nations and adding an34
other bureaucratic layer.
9. Limitation on Imports by the Public Sector. To try to reduce
the balance of payments deficit and contain inflation, a ceiling on
public sector imports was imposed for 1980 of 80 % of the value of the
sector's 1979 imports. Included within this limitation are domestic
30. Cent. Bank Res. No. 586 of Dec. 10, 1979.
31. Cent. Bank Res. No. 595 of Jan. 16, 1980.
32. Cent. Bank Res. No. 592 of Dec. 7, 1979.
33. Cent. Bank Res. No. 581 of Dec. 7, 1979.
34. Decree-Law Nos. 1,724 and 1,726 of Dec. 7, 1979; Finance Minister Portaria
No. 960 of Dec. 7, 1979.
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market purchases, leasing, or rental of imported goods or services.
This limitation does not apply, however, to three areas: (1) petroleum, (2) the steel industry, and (3) electric energy. 5
10. Freezing of Resolution 432 Deposits. As previously discussed,
loan deposits shifting
the exchange risk to the Central Bank could not
36
be withdrawn.
11. Demise of the Law on Similars. The President announced
that the role of the Law of Similars, which is really more of a policy
than a law, in protecting national industry from foreign competition
would be sharply diminished. This so-called law prevents tariff reductions on products similar to those currently being produced in Brazil.
Determining whether products are really similar has been an administrative nightmare. By abolishing most exemptions from import duties,
Decree-Law No. 1,726 of December 7, 1979, eviscerated the policy
instrument through which the Law of Similars functioned.
While the December 7th package is a commendable step in the
right direction, Brazil has a long way to go to reach the goal of a free
market economy. The government still controls most prices and wages
and tightly controls licenses for imports and exports. The government
still directly attempts to control interest rates and the supply of credit.
Although a committee of the Ministers of Finance, Planning, and
Debureaucratization has recently been entrusted with a destatization
directive to sell off certain state-owned companies to the national
private sector, a large segment of the economy is directly controlled
by the state through government-owned or controlled companies.
Foreign investment and technology transfers are also tightly controlled. While the government does not control inflation, it directly
controls the rate of monetary correction. Though it has a free market
component, the Brazilian economy in some respects resembles and is
treated by the government as a gigantic tinker toy.
Regulation of business is accomplished through myriad forms
and methods in Brazil. Rather than attempting to cover them all, the
next sections will concentrate on current trends in the following important areas of governmental control: prices, wages, credit and interest rates, foreign trade, technology transfers, environmental protection, and the regulation of foreign investment.

35. Decree No. 84,268 of Dec. 7, 1979.
36. See notes 10-11 supra and the text thereto.
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Price Controls
Despite decades of proven ineffectiveness in controlling inflation,
Brazilian price controls continue in force. This Sisyphean task is principally entrusted to the Interministerial Price Council (CIP: Conselho
Interministerial de Pregos), which has recently been moved from
the Ministry of Finance to the Ministry of Planning.3 7 CIP controls
the prices of about 75% of industrial products, some of the consumer
goods, and utility rates. It regulates, in typical Brazilian fashion,

without clearly defined rules.
CIP has three regulatory regimes. Certain products are subject to
flat controls; their prices cannot be raised without CIP authorization.
Others are subject to a potential rollback regime. On these items
prices can be raised if forty-five days have elapsed from the last hike
and CIP is notified. CIP can then order a rollback. The third regime is
called "accompanied liberty." Firms can raise prices freely on these
items, but they must keep CIP informed of each increase.
CIP has made an attempt to reward efficiency and to stimulate
local industry. Whenever the Council has determined that a firm's
salaries, commissions, or input costs were too high, it has cut back a
request for a price increase accordingly. If a firm imported items that
CIP believed could have been purchased locally, the Council has
pared the increase sought or withheld approval until concessions with

regard to greater local content were forthcoming.
Until recently, there was little evidence that CIP intentionally
misused its powers by forcing firms to operate at a loss, although
foreign pharmaceutical firms were treated particularly poorly.3 Nevertheless, the lags, paperwork, and uncertainty created by the regulatory process invariably caused substantial economic prejudice to
price-controlled firms. Although CIP is supposed to take action within
forty-five days of the filing of a request for a price increase, the
Council can, and frequently does, extend this for another forty-five
days simply by requesting more information to justify the requested
37. Decree No. 84,327 of Dec. 20, 1979.
38.

BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL CORP., A CORPORATE GUIDE TO SOLVING OPERATING

PROBLEMS IN BRAZIL

183-84, 190-94 (1978). One would think the results of this policy

would be to force foreign firms to undercut domestic firms. If it were imposed in
isolation, that might be true, but it is only part of the total picture. Local laboratories
are free to pirate drugs from foreign companies. The process of obtaining permission

from the National Service for Regulation of Medicine and Pharmacy (SNFMF:
Servicio Nacional de Fiscalizaco da Medicina e da Farmicia) to introduce new
drugs, usually a source of high profits for the foreign firms, has been recently
lengthened from about six months to two years, and very few applications are being
approved. CPI has also been underpricing new drugs. Id. at 190-94.
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increase. Hence, even if CIP grants the entire amount of a request,

with average price levels rising at 6 % to 7 % per month, a delay of
forty-five to ninety days often causes serious shrinkage of profit margins.

CIP is not the only government agency that controls prices. The
National Superintendency of Supplies (SUNAB: Superintend~ncia Nacional do Abastecimento) controls the prices of essential foodstuffs. In
1979-80 the number of commodities controlled directly by SUNAB
increased, as did the number of spot shortages. Insurance rates are set
by the Superintendency of Private Insurance (SUSEP: Superintend~ncia de Seguros Privados), while the prices of gasoline and other petroleum products are set by the National Petroleum Council (CNP:
Conselho Nacional do Petr6leo). Consequently, the consumer has
been deprived of the benefits of price competition in these products.
The government has announced plans to turn its antitrust
agency, the Administrative Council on Economic Protection (CADE:
Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econ6mica), into a price control
agency. 39 As an antitrust watchdog, CADE has been a fiasco. Since
its creation in 1964 to enforce an antitrust law modeled after the U.S.
antitrust laws, CADE has brought only forty-one administrative
actions. Only three of these resulted in convictions; twenty-one are
still being decided, and seventeen resulted in findings of no violation. 40 Whether this moribund agency will be more effective in
prosecuting price raisers for abuse of economic power is questionable.
Much more effective, if not precisely ethical, has been the Treasury's
fine-tooth comb investigations of the income tax returns of firms
whose prices have risen rapidly.
Toward the end of 1979, a significant change was made in
Brazilian price control policy. Instead of permitting price increases
whenever justified by rising input costs, Brazil decided to limit firms
to just two price increases a year. Moreover, these increases were to
correspond with the reported increase in the general price level rather
than with increases in a firm's actual costs. The results of this policy
were predictably disastrous. Business profits and investment fell
sharply, and many firms were forced to operate at a loss. In November 1980 the government announced both the abandonment of this
41
price control strategy and a general easing of controls.
Brazilian price controls require that firms engage in huge
amounts of paper work in their attempts to justify price increases.
39. Gazetta Mercantil, Jan. 10, 1980.
40. Id.
41. Bus. LAT. AM., Nov. 12, 1980, at 361-62.
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They also discourage firms from launching new products, deprive
consumers of a broad range of prices and products, create periodic
shortages, and badly distort economic efficiency. They obviously do
not control inflation in Brazil. Instead, they have become devices for
pursuing other socio-economic policies, such as promoting national
products and what regulators think is economic efficiency. In an era
of rapid inflation, stringent price controls often result in a de Jacto
taking of property, a contention which Brazilian courts have thus far
refused to recognize.4"
Wage Policy
The Brazilian government has exercised extensive control over
the labor movement ever since Gettilio Vargas instituted a syndicalist
system modeled upon the experience of Fascist Italy. Under this paternalistic system, employers are grouped into trade associations and
employees into government-controlled unions. The Ministry of Labor
runs a dues check-off system and turns funds back to officially approved unions. Government-dominated labor courts resolve labor
grievances and determine wage levels whenever collective bargaining
breaks down (dissidios). The government also determines fringe benefits, which in Brazil constitute a large chunk of every employer's wage
bill. The right to strike is subject to a series of procedural constraints,
such as the requirement of two strike votes, separated by a minimum
of two days, with the first needing a two-thirds majority. Moreover,
all strikes are prohibited against public services or essential activities. 43
In November 1979 a new wage policy was instituted with the
expectation of sharply reducing the rash of strikes accompanying political liberalization. 44 The new policy has utilized inflation as a
device to redistribute income from higher-paid to lower-paid workers.
It has also provided for semi-annual rather than annual wage adjustments, which had been a source of considerable dissatisfaction in the
context of galloping inflation. As originally implemented, the new
wage law automatically granted workers earning up to three times the
minimum wage a semiannual wage adjustment of 110% of the infla42. The Supreme Federal Tribunal has held that price controls do not result in an
unconstitutional taking of property even if they require a firm to operate at a loss.
Sociedadede Laticinios Dominio Ltda. v. Unido Federal, R.E. 52.010, 33 R.T.J. 720
(Supreme Tribunal Federal en banc 1965).
43. Law No. 4,330 of June 1, 1964. Although in theory unions have a right to
strike, this right was almost never exercised between 1964 and 1978 because of fear of
military repression.
44. Law No. 6,708 of Oct. 30, 1979.
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tion rate since the previous wage adjustment. Those earning between
four to ten times the minimum wage received an inflation adjustment
equal to the inflation rate, and workers earning more than ten times
the minimum wage received an 80 % inflation adjustment. The inflation adjustment has been determined by a new national consumer
price index, prepared by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and
Statistics (IBGE: Fundago Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica), by weighting preexisting consumer price indexes for the
principal cities and regions. Productivity increases, an undefined concept, have been left to collective bargaining and the labor courts.
This wage policy has been subjected to considerable criticism.
Higher paid workers have complained about falling behind inflation.
Critics have also claimed that the automatic semiannual wage adjustment of lower paid workers by more than the increase in the cost of
living is inflationary. A further complaint has been that the new
measure has done little to ensure labor peace. Instead, it has merely
shifted the name of the conflict from cost-of-living increases to productivity increases.
The new wage policy is presently in a state of flux. Legislation
adopted in December 1980 decidedly modified wage policy for those
on the high end of the salary scale. Those earning between 11 and 15
times the minimum wage now receive 80 % of the increase in the
consumer price index, while those earning between 16 and 20 times
the minimum wage receive only 50 % of that increase. Those earning
more than 20 times the minimum wage are now free from the mandatory inflation adjustment system .45 Modification may well be in store
for those at the lower end of the scale as well, for the minimum wage
levels which went into force on May 1, 1981, in all but a few states in
the Northeast did not contain the additional bonus of 10% of the
inflation rate for those earning between one and three multiples of the
minimum wage. Moreover, the rate of inflation reported by the national consumer price index for the twelve-month period ending in
April 1981 was only 101%, well below the 121.3 % figure reported for
the same period by the Getfilio Vargas Foundation's general price
46
index, the traditional inflation yardstick in Brazil.
The wage policy adopted in November 1979 has much to commend it in terms of social justice. Nevertheless, both the automatic
increases of wages in excess of productivity gains and the compensa-

45. Law No. 6,886 of Dec. 10, 1980.
46. Bus. LAT. AM., May 13, 1981, at 151.
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tion of workers for price increases resulting from declines in the terms
47
of trade were bound to fuel the country's already raging inflation.
Moreover, the wisdom of a policy which gives a sizeable percentage of
the work force a vested interest in sustaining a continually rising
inflation rate is dubious.

Regulation of Credit and Interest
The Brazilian government regulates credit markets through a

variety of techniques other than traditional monetary and fiscal policy. The government is by far the largest banker, influencing resource

allocation directly through its lending policies, which often consist of
providing funds at below market interest rates for activities it desires
to encourage. Currently, agriculture, exports, and energy have top

priority. The Bank of Brazil provides large amounts of credit to the
agricultural sector, much of it at heavily negative interest rates. The

Bank of Brazil and the National Economic Development Bank
(BNDE: Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econ6mico) maintain a
number of special funds to lend money at subsidized rates to Brazilian
controlled firms for specific purposes.

4

1

Restricting access to the cof-

fers of these special funds to Brazilian controlled firms, provides a
strong incentive to foreign firms to accept a minority position in joint
ventures with Brazilian firms.

Subsidized credits for exports are available through CACEX.
Companies wishing to invest in the Amazon or Northeast regions, for

example, can receive subsidized financing through SUDENE or
SUDAM, which distribute tax incentive funds for investment projects
in their respective areas.
47. A substantial rise in import prices relative to export prices cause a decline in
the country's real income. Brazil's trade account ran a deficit of $2.8 billion in 1980,
despite an impressive 31 % increase in export earnings, primarily because of the sharp
increases in the price of oil imports, which accounted for 43 % of Brazil's total import
bill. Failure to net out this real income decline from a wage indexation scheme
contributes to a wage-price spiral. Brazil's experience is confirmed by the sharp rises
in inflation rates in 1974 in several Western European countries indexing wages to
the consumer price index. Ross-Skinner, The Failure of Indexation, DUN's REVIEW
76-79 (Sept. 1977). See also, Bernstein, Indexing Money Payments in a Large and
ProlongedInflation, EssAYs ON INFLATION AND INDEXATION 71, 73-75 (H. Giersch et
al. 1974)
48. For example, the Fund for the Financing of Industrial Machinery and Equipment (FINAME: Fundo de Financiamento para Aquisigdo de Miquinas e Equipamento Industriais) provides credit for the production and purchase of domestically
produced capital goods; the Fund for the Democratization of Company Capital
(FUNDECE: Fundo de Democratizagdo do Capital das Empresas) lends funds for
working capital of companies going public.
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Government regulatory policy has been to require the private
banking system to make an increasing percentage of its loans to Brazilian controlled firms. The latest of the Central Bank pronouncements
on this subject raises the percentage of the total value of credit transactions by banks, credit companies and financial institutions that
must be extended to Brazilian individuals or locally controlled firms
from 60 % to 70 % . o This leaves only 30 % to be divided among the
multinational and state companies.
Foreign firms unable to tap the domestic credit market through
the banking system used to raise funds by tapping the Brazilian capital
market. But the Securities Commission (CVM: Comissdo de Valores
Mobilifirios) recently invoked an unwritten rule imposing a toll charge
on foreign firms wishing to issue debentures. Such firms must agree to
bring into Brazil equity capital in an amount equal to that raised by
issuing debentures.
Foreign loans are tightly regulated by the Central Bank. These
regulations change fairly rapidly in accordance with the Bank's appraisal of the country's balance of payments, market conditions and
capital needs. New loans presently can have a spread of 1.5-2.0%
over LIBOR (London Inter-Bank Offered Rate). Although they must
also have a minimum term of eight years and a thirty month grace
period, they may later be repassed to other borrowers for 18 month
intervals.5 0 Import financing arrangements of up to 180 days need no
special authorization; those extending between 181 and 360 days need
special authorization from CACEX; and those extending beyond 360
days need both authorization from CACEX and registration with the
Central Bank. The Central Bank also influences the length of loans
through its policy of rebating to the borrower part of the 25 % Brazilian withholding tax on remittances abroad. This rebate is currently
set at 40 % of the tax. To be eligible for the rebate, foreign currency or5
import financing loans must extend over a minimum of eight years . 1
The drying up of cruzeiro financing is causing firms to look to the
Eurodollar market again, even though many suffered severe losses in
the December 1979 maxi-devaluation. The government's response to
these exchange losses has left much to be desired. To prevent a decline
in tax collection levels, it enacted a decree-law which denies companies whose base year includes any month in the second half of 1979
the right to deduct for income tax purposes foreign exchange losses in
49. Cent. Bank Res. No. 656 of Dec. 17, 1980.
50. Cent. Bank Res. No. 229 of Sept. 1, 1971. See generally, Skola, supra note 8.

51. Cent. Bank Res. No. 559 of July 26, 1979.
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excess of the percentage variation in the ORTN.5 2 Since the ORTN
increased in value by only 47.19% in 1979, firms were prevented
from writing off as much as 60.61 % of the increase in their indebted-

ness from the 1979 devaluation. This decree-law was quickly followed
by a ruling of the CVM which permitted open capital corporations to
defer writing off the portion of exchange loss exceeding the ORTN
variation. 5 3 This accounting alchemy permitted a number of firms to

turn large losses into profits on their 1979 balance sheets. One result of
these measures was to increase the effective tax rate on the firms most

seriously hurt by the maxi-devaluation and to make it more difficult
for the public to evaluate the bottom line on corporate balance sheets.
In 1979 and 1980 the Central Bank made a concerted effort to
achieve two mutually contradictory goals: a reduction in interest rates

and a reduction in the amount of credit. In August 1979 the Central
Bank ordered all lending institutions to reduce their average interest
rates on loans to the private sector by 10 % starting September 3,

1979. 54 In April 1980 the Central Bank ordered Brazilian lending
institutions to limit expansion of their credit operations to 45 % of
their normal financing and discount operations on the last day of
1979.1 5 It is not surprising that such measures have been difficult to
enforce and have been the source of considerable tension between the

Central Bank and the private banks, many of which have been
warned and reprimanded for violations. Moreover, these measures
have spawned a wide variety of evasionary artifices, such as requiring
borrowers to pay for "consulting" fees, insurance policies, compensating balances, and purchase of government paper at special prices.
These artifices not only raised the effective interest rate, but also
raised the transaction costs for loans. The policy of attempting to hold
52. Decree-Law No. 1,733 of Dec. 20, 1979. Firms have two options with respect
to the non-deductible portion of their foreign exchange expenses. They can add these
sums to the cost of fixed assets, increasing depreciation deductions. Or they can
maintain these sums in a monetarily corrected deferred account to be written off as
these foreign currency obligations are repaid. In either case not more than 20% of
these deferred sums can be written off in any single fiscal year. But if the holder of a
foreign currency debt elects to convert it into equity (i.e., where parent corporations
are owed debts by their Brazilian subsidiaries), this 20% limitation does not apply.
53. CVM Deliberation 8, Jan. 8, 1980.
54. Cent. Bank Res. No. 560 of Aug. 30, 1979, ordered the reduction for commercial banks, and Res. No. 561 imposed a corresponding cutback for investment
banks, finance, and credit companies. Excluded from this across-the-board interest
rollback were rural credit, foreign loans, refinancing operations to official financial
institutions, and other credit operations subject to specific regulations. The average
lending rate was weighted for each type of loan transaction and was based upon
lending rates in effect during the month of August 1979.
55. Cent. Bank Res. No. 605 of Apr. 2, 1980.
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interest rates well below the inflation rate worked badly, forcing the
government to free interest rates for commercial and investment
banks in January 1981.16 The government has retained, however, its
policy of tightly limiting credit expansion. The rate of bank expansion
of credit has been limited to 5 % for the first quarter of 1981 and to
50 % for the entire year. 57 The combined effect of these policies has
been to make it exceedingly difficult for businesses to obtain cruzeiro
financing.
Foreign Trade

Imports, exports, and the foreign exchange rate have long been
subject to tight governmental control in Brazil. Both exports and
imports require licenses from CACEX and are subject to substantial
taxes or duties. Until December 10, 1979, imports were further discouraged by the requirement of a 100 % prior deposit, while exports
were encouraged by exemptions from the Tax on the Circulation of
Merchandise (ICM: Imposto sobre Operac6es Relativas h Circulacio de Mercadorias) and the IPI.
The December 7th pacote eliminated both the 100% prior deposit for imports and the IPI tax exemptions for exports, though the
effects of these changes were, at least for a time, more than counterbalanced by the 30% maxi-devaluation. Imports were also discouraged by another requirement: the public sector had to reduce its 1980
imports to 80 % of 1979 levels. Since the domestic inflation rate during
1980 was approximately twice the rate of cruzeiro devaluation, imports became progressively more attractive. To try to reduce imports
even further, CACEX instituted an unwritten policy of limiting imports of capital goods for a firm's own use to the value of the firm's
imports in the previous year. Imports for resale were also limited to
80 % of the previous year's imports. Foreign controlled firms were told
to import capital goods for their own use without exchange cover (in
effect characterizing their imports as equity investments) or to arrange external financing for at least five years. Even Brazilian controlled firms were told to arrange a minimum of five years external
financing, but if such financing proved to be unobtainable, CACEX
considered waiving this requirement. Cash sales were not prohibited,
but CACEX considered them "undesirable." Machinery components,
whether imported by foreign or locally controlled firms, were re-

56. Bus.
57. Id.

LAT.

AM,, Jan. 28, 1981, at 27, 31.
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quired to have a minimum of two years' foreign financing and could
be imported only for projects granted export incentives.- 8
In September 1980 a modified version of CACEX's informal
import constraint policy was formally enacted into law in the form of
a Central Bank resolution. 59 This resolution established a sliding
scale of minimum external financing terms for imports, ranging from
three years for those machines, equipment, instruments, vehicles,
ships, and airplanes with an FOB value of U.S. $100,000 to $300,000,
up to eight years for goods with values in excess of $5,000,000.60 Spare
parts had to have a two-year minimum financing period if the import
license were issued prior to December 31, 1980, and one year if issued
thereafter. Durable consumer goods and raw and intermediate materials for the steel and chemical industries had to have a minimum
term of 180 days if the invoice amount exceeded $100,000.
The increase in the IOF tax rate from 15 % to 25%, imposed at
the end of 1980,61 has also made imports less attractive. This tax on
the purchase of foreign exchange, which applies to a little over half of
all imports (only petroleum is exempt), is a more pervasive disincentive to imports than the 100% prior deposit scheme, which affected
only 20%-30 % of imports and was eliminated as part of the December 1979 pacote.6 2 In addition, during 1981 the government has
sharply stepped up the pace of devaluation of the cruzeiro, 63 thereby
making imports even more expensive.
With few exceptions, goods may be freely exported from Brazil.
A nontransferable export license must be obtained from CACEX for
all products except coffee, whose exportation is subject to special rules
issued by the Brazilian Coffee Institute. CACEX controls the prices at
which goods are exported by publishing minimum export prices. At
the time it issues a license, CACEX must approve the firm's expenses
for freight, insurance, and agent's commission. Generally, CACEX
will not permit payment of a commission from the exporter to a
parent or affiliated companies on exports for which a company has
64
received investment incentives in return for a commitment to export.
58. Bus.

LAT.

AM., Jy. 16, 1980, at 226-27; Gazeta Mercantil, Je. 20, 1980.

59. Cent. Bank Res. No. 638 of Sept. 24, 1980, as modified by Cent. Bank Circ.

No. 574 of Oct. 27, 1980.
60. Circ. No. 574 defines the FOB value as the corresponding amount set forth in
the respective import license.

61. Decree-Law No. 1,844 of Dec. 30, 1980.
62. Bus. LAT. AM., Feb. 25, 1981, at 61.
63. Id.
64. CACEX Communique No. 79 of Jan. 31, 1979.
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Exporters still receive substantial tax and financing incentives.
Thus exporters can reduce their taxable income for income tax purposes by the same proportion that export sales bear to total sales. The
25% withholding tax on foreign remittances may be reduced or refunded for exporters of manufactured goods. A drawback regime
permits reductions of import duties and the value added tax (ICM) on
exported goods. A special agency, the Commission for the Concession
of Fiscal Benefits and Special Programs for Exportation (BEFIEX:
Comissiio para Concessdo de Beneficios Fiscais e Programas Especiais
de Exportagdo), is empowered: to extend the tax loss carry forward
by two additional years, to permit Brazilian companies to use any
supplementary tax on dividends in excess of 12% of registered capital
paid to foreign shareholders as a credit against its own federal taxes,
and to reduce duties on imported components. An Export Incentives
Commission (CIEX: Comiss~o de Incentivos us Exportai5es) also
grants incentives similar to those in the BEFIEX program to companies carrying out a specific export commitment. Special legislation
permits the tax-free importation of an entire factory into Brazil so
long as its output is essentially designed for export. 65 In addition,
export financing is available at interest rates well below the market.
Brazil is presently seeking a dramatic increase in exports. Consequently, some of the bureaucratic red tape accompanying exports is
being cut back.6 6 In addition, the Industrialized Products Tax (IPI)
credit, which had been eliminated as part of the December 1979
reform package, has been reinstated at a level of 15 percent for
exporters of manufactured goods. This tax credit is scheduled to drop
to 9 % for 1982 and to disappear completely in mid-1983.67 Revival
of the IPI credit for exporters is likely to revive complaints of unfair
incentives to exporters from Brazil's major trading partners. Moreover, it restores another layer of bureaucratic complexity. The measure is, however, a logical outgrowth of Brazil's policy of devaluing
the cruzeiro far less than the differential between the domestic inflation rate and the inflation rate of its major trading partners.
Technology Transfers
One of the most frustrating aspects of Brazilian regulation of
business is the transfer of foreign technology. Brazilians have long
65. Decree-Law No. 1,244 of Oct. 31, 1972.
66. Red tape still abounds, however. See notes 18-19 supra and accompanying
text.
67. Minister of Finance Portaria No. 78 of Apr. 1, 1981.
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harbored a deep-seated conviction that Brazilian licensees are being
overcharged for the use of foreign technology. They are also convinced that balance-of-payments, import substitution, domestic technology development, and export promotion goals can best be served
by tight regulation of technology transfers.
The basic statutory rules are themselves fairly arbitrary. Trademark royalties are limited to a maximum of 1 % of net sales, and
patent royalties cannot exceed 1 % to 5% of net sales."' The precise
percentage permitted depends on both how important the National
Institute of Intellectual Property (INPI) deems the technology and
how the product fits into a table prepared in 1958 for the purpose of
limiting income tax deductions for royalties paid by Brazilian subsidiaries to foreign parent companies.69 This table, which made little
sense in 1958, makes even less sense today.
If the recipient of foreign technology is controlled by the transferor, royalty payments may be neither remitted nor deducted for tax
purposes. Payments for technical assistance between subsidiary and
parent are treated as if they were dividends for the purpose of assessing the supplemental tax on profit remittances above 12 % of regis70
tered capital.
All technical assistance and patent licensing agreements must be
approved by INPI and registered with the Central Bank before any
foreign currency payments can be made to the transferor of the technology. Unless the agreement is part of a project which the government considers of high priority, securing INPI approval is very difficult and time consuming. Payments can be made in cruzeiros, but the
tax authorities have taken the position that the Brazilian payor may
not deduct such payments as business expenses unless the agreement is
duly approved by INPI. 7" The Federal Appellate Tribunal (TFR)
has, however, recently permitted such deduction,
ruling that the tax
72
authorities' position had no basis in law.
INPI has made patent licensing extremely difficult. No royalty
payments can be made until the foreign patent has been registered

68. Law No. 4,131 of Sept. 3, 1962, arts. 12-13.
69. Ministry of Finance Portaria No. 436 of Dec. 30, 1958.
70. Law No. 4,131 of Sept. 3, arts. 13-14.
71. This position was originally set out in Normative Opinion No. 102/75 of the
Coordinator of the Tax System. It is now embodied in art. 176(1)(e) I, 176(2), and
177(3) of the Income Tax Regulations (Decree No. 76,186 of Sept. 2, 1975).
72. Pirelli S/A Cia. Indtistria Brasileira v. Unido, REO 81,966, Dec. 14, 1979,
Diirio da Justiqa of Mar. 5, 1980, at 1092.
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with INPI, which in 1980 had a nine-year backlog. 73 INPI flatly
refuses to register certain types of patents, such as product or process
patents on drugs, food, or medicine. Patent licensors are required to
grant the licensee ownership of all improvements made by the licensor. No tie-in provisions are permitted, nor can there be limitations on
output, price, or export of the product. The licensor cannot prevent
free use of data or technical information after expiration of the patent. Moreover, he can charge for the basic engineering package only
as an advance against royalties.7 1 Since the term of the Brazilian
patent is deemed to run from the date of the application and royalties
cannot be remitted beyond the life of the patent in the country of
origin, 75 the potential life of a licensing agreement is relatively short.
Some potential licensors rationally conclude that the rewards from
Brazilian licensing operations are not worth the hassle.
To register an unpatented technology or know-how agreement,
one has to satisfy INPI that the technology meets the following six
criteria: (1) domestic unavailability, (2) compatibility with national
development priorities, (3) utility in developing the sector, (4) utility
in improving the quality of the product, (5) utility in import substitution, and (6) the ability of the transferee to absorb the technology
during the life of the agreement. 78 Secrecy clauses, which are often
critical with unpatented technology, are limited to those INPI deems
reasonable.7 7 To register a technical assistance agreement, one has to
satisfy INPI that the proposed agreement meets the following five
criteria: (1) the proposed technicians are not available locally, (2) the
proposed compensation and expenses are reasonable, (3) the foreign
technicians will not remain in Brazil longer than necessary, (4) the
Brazilian company will master the technology quickly, and (5) the
investment is consistent with developmental priorities.7 "
Generally speaking, technical assistance agreements cannot exceed five years even if the parties are unrelated. Once authorities at

73. INPI is now examining patent applications submitted between 1972 and
1976. It hopes to cut back its backlog by farming out some of these applications and

by determining applications submitted in 1977 in 1981. Gazeta Mercantil, May 17,
1980.
74. Nattier, Limitations on Marketing Foreign Technology in Brazil, 11
LAW.

INT'L

437, 445-46 (1977).

75. Id. at 443-44.
76. Normative Act No. 15 of Sept. 11, 1975, art. 4.1.2 and 4.2(h).
77. Id. at 4.5.2(d)(vi). With respect to patent licenses, INPI prohibits the licensor
from impairing free use of data and information transferred after expiration of the
patent, Id. at art. 2.5.2(b)(iii).
78. Id. at art. 4.
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INPI are convinced that technological innovations require a greater
period, they may grant an extension of up to five more years. In no
case, however, may a technical assistance agreement exceed ten
years. 7
INPI has recently decided that certain sectors should be freed
from dependence on imported technology. This policy determination
is most clearly reflected in Normative Act No. 30 of Janurary 19,
1978, which states that INPI will no longer approve technology transfer agreements for the automobile industry. The only exception is for
Specialized Technical Services which are necessary but unavailable in
Brazil. Normative Act No. 30 also prohibits foreign auto manufacturers from charging their Brazilian subsidiaries with any expenses
for: (1) administrative, financial, and marketing services; (2) salaries
and travel or transfer expenses of foreign personnel assigned to activities not specifically linked to specific and temporary technical services; and (3) research and development performed by the parent
company. No payments can be made for any projects of new models
and manufacturing methods developed abroad, with the exception of
projects for engines and mechanical components beyond the technological levels currently attained in Brazil. One can anticipate that
INPI will gradually extend this type of treatment to other industries as
Brazil strives to stimulate and develop its own sources of technology
and to cut the umbilical cord to foreign technology.
INPI has also recently added an additional layer to the time-consuming process of securing its approval by requiring that virtually all
technology agreements be submitted to it for prior approval. 80 Parties to technology transfer agreements, with the exception of those of
an occasional nature involving less than $20,000 or the inspection or
assembly of imported equipment, must submit a draft of the proposed
agreement, along with a Portuguese translation in parallel columns on
the same page as the language chosen by the foreign party. The draft
must be accompanied by a complex special form detailing the stock
ownership of the Brazilian company, any relationships between the
parties, the need to import the technology, the exact terms of the
compensation agreed upon, alternative sources of the technology,
either in Brazil or abroad, and why this particular technology supplier
has been chosen. In addition, all existing or contemplated technology
agreements between the parties must be submitted regardless of
whether approval has been already granted or is unnecessary. Although ostensibly designed to expedite the process of securing approval of technology transfers, the compulsory prior consultation has
79. Law No. 4,131 of Sept. 3, 1962, art. 12(3).
80. Normative Act No. 32 of May 5, 1978.
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a tendency to slow them down because INPI approval must be secured
twice. Prior approval does not prevent INPI from refusing final approval. Moreover, the procedure is designed to permit INPI to take an
even more active role in making itself a party to the negotiations by
insisting upon changes in the language and terms of the agreement.
Despite the guidelines of Normative Act No. 15 and the prior
consultation procedure of Normative Act No. 32, INPI is still both
unpredictable and dilatory. In recent years it has been following a
fairly restrictive policy because of Brazil's serious balance-of-payments problems. In 1979 INPI refused to approve about 36% of the
applications it considered; 8' however, this figure is misleading because
it does not mention the much larger number of agreements that had to
be modified substantially to secure INPI approval. INPI has also been
encouraging Brazilian firms to82 pay fixed prices for technology rather
than a percentage of receipts.
INPI's delays are more exasperating than its disapprovals or exigencies. When an agreement is signed, the technology is almost invariably needed yesterday. But just supplying the necessary documentation for INPI's preliminary consultation is likely to require several
months. Receiving a response from INPI typically consumes several
more months, not to mention the additional time required to renegotiate the changes that INPI is likely to insist upon. The applicant must
wait for final INPI approval, which typically requires several additional months. Even after INPI approval, on occasion, the Central
Bank has refused to register an agreement because it deemed the
technology marginal.
Two recent court challenges seeking to compel INPI to approve
technology agreements without changes were unsuccessful. The fact
pattern of the first case illustrates the frustration and delay that INPI
all too frequently produces. This suit was brought by Resena S/A
Indtistrias Quimicas, which began negotiations for a patent license
with a French company in 1974. 83 In April 1975 the proposed agreement was submitted to INPI for prior approval. In August 1975, after
INPI insisted upon certain changes in the agreement, the patent
agreement was renegotiated and resubmitted to INPI in April 1976.
81. Jornal do Comrcio, May 7, 1980, at 6. Of the agreements approved by
INPI, 80% were in the areas of petroleum and petro-chemicals, nuclear and electric
energy, capital goods, steel, and nonmetallic materials. The great bulk of the approved agreements were for engineering services. Id.
82. Gazeta Mercantil, May 17, 1980.
83. Decision of 1st Federal Court in Rio de Janeiro, Nov. 27, 1979. A fairly
complete report of this case appears in 3 L. ECKSTROM, LICENSINC IN FomREGN AND
DomEsTic OPEATIONS 29-231 to 29-241 (rev. 1980).
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One of the two patent applications involved in the agreement was
issued in Brazil in April 1978. In June 1979 INPI informed the licensee
that a number of additional changes would have to be made before
approval of the license agreement. These changes were based upon
the guidelines of Normative Act No. 15, issued subsequent to the
initial request for approval. The petition for a writ of security was
rejected on two grounds: (1) the total compensation called for in the
agreement had to be reduced because only one of the two patents
being licensed had been registered in Brazil (the other had been
denied); and (2) one of the clauses now objected to by INPI had not
been in the original draft of the agreement. Significantly, the federal
judge's opinion indicated that had both patents been issued and had
no new clauses been introduced into the agreement, INPI's insistence
upon additional requirements for an agreement previously approved
would have been an abuse of power.
The second suit was brought by Royal Diamond Diel~ctricos
S.A., which had also negotiated a technology transfer agreement with
a French company.8 4 The proposed agreement was submitted in
June 1978. In April 1979 INPI insisted upon several changes, including a reduction in the term of the agreement to five years, starting
from December 1, 1977. In this case the Brazilian licensee directly
attacked INPI's actions for exceeding its powers and for having no
legal basis. The federal court rejected both challenges as unfounded
and sustained INPI's authority to regulate transfers in a manner
deemed appropriate to national development needs.
INPI is a classic example of an agency whose bureaucratic intermeddling either drives up the cost of investment projects or drives
them away. No one really knows how much useful technology remains unavailable in Brazil because of the restrictive and unpredictable regulating of INPI. It is highly probable that future research will
show that Brazil would have been far better off if INPI had been
confined to registering patents and if Brazilian companies had been
allowed to purchase whatever technology they wished upon terms
dictated by the market.
Brazil's success in obtaining foreign technology despite INPI's
unpredictable regulation is quite remarkable. Most firms evidently
feel the Brazilian market is too large and has too much potential to
ignore and are therefore willing to tolerate the hassle in order to enter
it. The danger is that this calculus may be changing, and Brazil may
84. Decision of 7th Federal Court in Rio de Janeiro, Mar. 19, 1980. A fairly
complete report of this case appears in L. ECKSTROM, supra note 83, at 29-241 to
29-245.
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be missing the boat in acquiring the latest technology. Nevertheless,
Brazilian supporters of INPI feel that Brazilian firms must be pressed
to develop their own technology, and that INPI's efforts have helped
keep the import bill at a minimum.
Environmental Protection
Until fairly recently Brazil was a polluter's paradise. Indeed,
many heavy pollution industries fled to Brazil to escape restrictive
legislation in their home countries. The official Brazilian attitude used
to be: pollution is a price we must pay for our development. In recent
years Brazil has decided to shave that price by enacting three significant measures: (1) creation of a Special Secretariat for the Environment (SEMA: Secretaria Especial do Meio Ambiente) with powers to
promulgate pollution control regulations, 85 (2) a national environ87
mental zoning law, 86 and (3) a national environmental policy.
The environmental zoning law creates three types of zones. Zone
one is for the heaviest polluters. All firms which emit objectionable
noises, smoke, radiation, or hazardous wastes must be located in areas
zoned one. Zone two is for normal industry, and zone three is for
non-industrial use. Firms causing some environmental damage or
discomfort are, however, permitted to locate in zone three, provided
that they are not hazardous to the health of the residents of that area.
Pollution standards for all three zones are set by the SEMA or local
environmental protection agencies. In the past few years state and
local agencies have taken the lead in forcing polluters to clean up and
to install protective devices. But firms whose operation is considered
of high interest to development or national security may not be shut
down without an order from the federal government.
A recent statute requires relocation of industries situated in the
wrong zone if suitable controls cannot be installed. 88 As zones become more saturated, authorities have the power to insist upon
greater controls. Licensing from SEMA and state and local authorities
is now necessary for installation in critical pollution areas. Zoning is
still the responsibility of state governments, as is most of the monitoring, but control over location of petrochemical, chlorochemical, carbochemical, and nuclear industries is reserved to the federal government.
85. Decree No. 73,030 of Oct. 30, 1973.
86. Decree-Law No. 1,413 of Aug. 14, 1975.

87. Law No. 6,938 of Aug. 31, 1981.
88. Law No. 6,803 of Jy. 2, 1980.

BRAZILIAN REGULATIONS OF BUSINESS

Although Brazilian pollution standards are still less stringent than
those of more developed countries, they are tightening up. This trend
towards stricter pollution control enforcement is likely to accentuate
as governments become more concerned with the quality of life and
less concerned with economic growth statistics.
Foreign Investment
The basic regulations on foreign investment in Brazil have not
changed significantly since 1964. Generally speaking, foreign companies are free to invest money or assets, such as machinery and
equipment, in Brazil. Such investments must be registered with the
Central Bank in order for the investor to be able to repatriate them
and to remit dividends, but the Bank normally acts expeditiously and
does not act as a screening agency. The original investment is registered in the currency of the country where the foreign investor is
incorporated or domiciled.
Duly registered investments are freely repatriable at any time.
Only if there is a serious disequilibrium in the balance-of-payments
may such repatriation be suspended,8 but this provision has never
been invoked. To encourage profit reinvestment and to discourage
excessive remittances, profit remittances that average more than 12 %
of registered investments and reinvestments a year over a three-year
period are subject to a steep supplemental tax, which starts at 40 %
and rises quickly to 60%. Because there is a 25 % withholding tax
(reduced to 10 %-15 % by treaty for certain countries) on profit remittances, the maximum permissible dividend without incurring the supplemental tax is 16% .90
Brazil has an enviable record for treating the foreign investor
fairly. 9' Particularly if one compares the Brazilian experience with
neighboring countries, such as Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and
Venezuela, it is plain that Brazilian treatment of the foreign investor
has been exceptionally hospitable since 1964, when the basic rules
were fixed in their present form. These rules impose comparatively
few restraints on the foreign investor and have enjoyed remarkable
longevity.
These basic rules are, nevertheless, deficient in several respects.
First, they presuppose that the investor's home currency is stable, an
89. Law No. 4, 131 of Sept. 3, 1962, as modified by Law No. 4,390 of Aug. 29,
1964, art. 28.
90. Rosenn, Treatment of the Foreign Investor: The Brazilian Style, in THE
FuuT uR OF BRAZIL, 245, 269-70 (W. Overholt ed. 1978).
91. Id. at 255-78.
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assumption that is obviously not true. Inflation has reduced the real
value of investments denominated in U.S. dollars by more than half
since 1969. Consequently, the maximum rate of return without incurring the supplemental tax on an investment registered in 1969 dollars
is actually less than 6 % in real terms (ignoring reinvested profits).
Second, these rules encourage firms to make a large percentage of
their investments in the form of loans rather than equity capital. In
1964 interest rates were considerabley lower than they are today.
Rates of return can be much higher than the 12 % dividend limitation
if the investment is characterized as a loan, and part of the withholding tax can be rebated to the Brazilian borrower. A sizeable chunk of
Brazil's foreign debt results from the economic incentive to invest by
means of loans rather than equity. Third, the 12% return to registered capital is unfair to service companies, such as engineering or
accounting firms, which have relatively low capital needs. Fourth,
the rules generally do not permit firms to make an investment in the
form of technology, a policy which makes no economic sense.9 2 Yet
these rules seem to work reasonably well in practice, and few feel they
are really unfair. Thus far, most firms have been remitting much less
than 12% on their registered capital, preferring to reinvest their
earnings in Brazil. Given the deep seated emotions surrounding foreign investment, the present regime has no desire to reopen the issue
of the Profit Remittance Law. For a time, at least, Pandora's box will
remain closed.
There is, however, an increasing trend towards imposition of
more restrictive conditions upon foreign investment and towards declaring certain areas off limits entirely to foreign investors. Brazilian
controlled companies are being preferred in obtaining cruzeiro financing and investment incentives. Bidding on the firms the government is offering to restore to private hands is restricted, at least
initially, to Brazilians. Foreigners cannot acquire rural land except
under certain conditions, nor can they acquire shares of Brazilian
companies directly on the stock market; only purchases of shares of
special investment companies are permitted. Foreigners are barred
from participation in the communication media, domestic airlines,
and coastal shipping. New foreign investment in banks and insurance
92. A few companies have been permitted to capitalize technology. For example,
Hydreco was permitted to capitalize its technology by making a five-year sales
forecast and calculating the value of the technology by projecting royalties received
from European countries at rates higher than INPI would have approved. A 25%

withholding tax was assessed upon this valuation. Brazilian authorities, however, are
reportedly reluctant to permit other firms to follow the same procedure. BusINEss
INTERNATIONAL CofuP., supra note 38, at 19-20.
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companies is restricted, though existing companies are permitted to do
business normally. There is an unwritten rule that foreign capital
cannot control more than one-third of the voting stock of newly
established leasing companies and financing companies. It is government policy to insist that Brazilians own a majority of the equity in
virtually all large mining projects, ventures for the production of
telephone exchange equipment, mini-computers, and semi-conductors. Generally, the government has pushed a three-way split among
foreign capital, state capital, and Brazilian private capital in petrochemical ventures. Government agencies usually exert continual pres-

sure on foreign investors to accept local partners and to increase the
percentage of national content in their products.
Foreign companies have been effectively excluded from much of
the computer industry. Normative Act No. 16, issued by the Secretariat for Data Processing in July 1981, mandates rejection of new data

processing projects unless all of the following three conditions are
satisfied: (1) control of the proponent's stock is in the hands of Brazilian individuals who are both resident and domiciled in Brazil, (2) the
proponent's capital structure is compatible with the size of the project, and (3) the project utilizes technology developed in Brazil.
An ominous portent of the trend of future legislation reserving
certain activities to Brazilians is a recent law limiting the business of
highway transport to Brazilians.9 3 This statute's restrictive provisions
make it extremely difficult for foreigners to accept even a minority
interest in Brazilian highway transport firms. Such firms must be
owned by Brazilian individuals or legal entities in which 80 % of the
voting stock is owned by Brazilians. In addition, all directors and
administrators must be Brazilian. If it has any foreign capital, a
highway transport firm's legal structure must be a corporation (sociedadeanonima) with registered shares, and no special treatment for
the foreign shareholder may be stipulated. While these restrictions do
not apply to companies presently engaged in highway transport, even
this grandfather clause contains the seeds of foreign capital's divestment. With the exception of shares stemming from monetary correction of the balance sheet, 80% of any future increases in common
stock must be in registered form and must be subscribed to by Brazilians.
Finally, securing visas permitting foreign personnel to work in
Brazil generally requires an exasperating number of trips around
bureaucratic mulberry bushes. A new immigration law, 94 primarily
93. Law No. 6,813 of Jy. 10, 1980.
94. Law No. 6,815 of Aug. 19, 1980.
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aimed at controlling missionaries and illegal aliens, has added an
extra layer to already tortuous visa procedures. Unless working for the
Brazilian government, foreign personnel sent to Brazil must satisfy the
requirements of both the newly created National Council on Immigration and the Ministry of Labor. The new statute also permits
conditioning issuance of a permanent visa on the immigrant's spending up to five years in a region designated by the Brazilian government.
The welcome mat is still out for foreign investment. Nonetheless,
this trend towards greater reservation of certain markets, credit, and
incentives for Brazilian capital indicates that the mat is being steadily
pulled back, at least around the edges.
IV.

TRENDS IN REGULATION OF BuSINESS DURING THE

1980s

Future trends in government regulation of business are obviously
going to depend upon the paths of political and economic events.
Brazil is presently in the grips of a serious economic crisis. The country must find a way of reducing its annual inflation rate from more
than 100 % to a more normal 15 % -20 % rate. It must generate enough
foreign currency to service its huge foreign debt and to pay for its
essential imports; the two, taken together, far exceed export income."5 It has to curtail the rash of strikes and buy labor peace. And
it has to generate about 1.5 million jobs a year due to population
growth.
Delfim Neto, the Planning Minister, unsuccessfully gambled that
inflation could be reduced on the supply side. His theory was that
economic growth would cause the supply of goods and services to
increase more rapidly than demand would be fueled by the 45 %
increase he had targeted for the money supply in 1980. He also sought
to reduce inflationary pressures by curtailing expenditures by stateowned companies, restricting credit while keeping a lid on interest
rates, prefixing monetary correction at rates well below the actual
inflation rate, forcing manufacturers to absorb cost increases through
price controls, and slowing the rate of devaluation to about half the
inflation rate. As a result of these policies, Brazil's GNP grew by 8.5%
95. At the end of 1979 Brazil's overall foreign debt was $54 billion. During 1980
Brazil's overall foreign debt increased by $7.3 billion to $61.3 billion. The cost of
servicing that debt in 1980 came to $6.94 billion in interest and $7 billion in
amortization of principal. Despite an impressive 31% increase in export earnings,
Brazil ran a trade deficit of $2.83 billion in 1980. Pardo, Brazil's Needs and Sources
of External Financing in 1981, paper presented at Brazil: Update for the Foreign
Investor in Miami, Fl. on Mar. 11, 1981.
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in 1980, but triple-digit inflation persisted. Savings and investment
declined, and the overvalued exchange rate encouraged imports and
discouraged exports.
In November 1980 Delfim recognized the failure of his gamble
and resorted to more traditional belt-tightening economic policies.
Price controls are being less rigidly applied, permitting many firms to
improve their profit picture. Full ex post monetary correction has
been restored, albeit tied to a price index that has been reporting a
lower rate of inflation than traditional price indexes. The cruzeiro is
being devalued more rapidly in accordance with the differential between Brazilian inflation and that of Brazil's principal trading partners. In addition, interest rates have been allowed to rise to more
realistic levels. Nonetheless, triple-digit inflation has persisted.
Other parts of Delfim's economic policies have been more successful or offer greater potentiality for success. The goal of increasing
exports by more than 30% was met in 1980, and Brazil was able to
borrow $12 billion abroad to cover its balance-of-payments deficit.
The large investments in programs to modernize agriculture and to
substitute imported oil with alcohol and hydroelectric power show
considerable promise for the future.
There are at least three possible scenarios for the future of governmental regulation of business in Brazil. The likelihood of their
coming to pass depends upon a complex mix of economic and political
developments.
One possible scenario is that Brazil will successfully weather the
present economic crisis. With more orthodox fiscal and monetary
policies, the inflation rate should gradually decline to more tolerable
levels. Increased exports and foreign lending should enable Brazil to
resolve its short run balance-of-payments crunch. In the medium run,
the investments in Pro-Alcohol and a modernized agricultural sector
might cure the balance-of-payments deficit and relieve some of the
inflationary pressure. In this event, the transition from 16 years of
military rule to full democracy might well proceed as planned. If this
occurs, a new constitution is likely to be one of the first items on the
agenda. Politicians are becoming increasingly vocal in their demands
for a constituent assembly, for the 1967 Constitution bestowed on the
country by the military contains a number of provisions inconsistent
with traditional Brazilian concepts of democracy. The model for a
new constitution is likely to be the 1946 Constitution, widely regarded
among jurists as Brazil's only modern and authentic democratic constitution. Modeled after that of the United States, it differs primarily
in the greater legislative power of the federal government at the
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expense of the states and the greater executive power of the president
at the expense of the Congress. Under this constitutional format, a
democratically elected Congress would do the bulk of the legislating,
while the President would do less legislating and more administering.
The nation's highest court, the Supreme Federal Tribunal, which was
packed and unpacked like a suitcase during the 1960s, would be
restored to its traditional strength and independence.
A return to a 1946-style constitution would provide the business
community with the benefit of greater predictability. Less rapid legislative change would occur because bills would have to be aired in
committee and then debated. The more open legislative process
should also provide businessmen with greater opportunity to make
their views heard and to know what kinds of legislative changes to
expect. Though likely to retain broad decree-making powers, the
executive should lose his power to present legislation to Congress as a
fait accompli.
One current trend likely to continue or accelerate with a democratically elected regime is the trend towards nationalistic legislation
regulating multinationals and foreign investors. After so many years
of overt encouragement of foreign investors and such a substantial
multinational presence, a popular reaction is to be expected. A substantial amount of nationalistic legislation has already been proposed,
and some of these bills are likely to become law in the near future.
One measure which may be slated for early passage is a Multinational Ethics Code, already passed by the House of Deputies and
approved by the Senate's Commission on the Constitution and Justice.06 A glance at the bill makes it clear that the executive has no
monopoly on poor draftsmanship. The bill simply states that the
conduct required from any foreign-controlled company operating in
Brazil shall be to refrain from the practice of any of the following
acts:
1. Interfering in Brazil's internal affairs or those involving Brazil
and any other nation.
2. Acting as an instrument of foreign policy of any country.
3. Failure to cooperate in achieving national objectives and priorities and priorities for development fixed by the federal government,
or doing anything that effectively prejudices such objectives.
4. Offering an obstacle to the federal government's obtaining infor96. This bill is reproduced in its entirety in Jornal do Brasil, May 8, 1980, and Je.

1, 1980. It is actually an adaptation of II basic rules contained in a draft that Brazil
and other Latin American countries submitted to a U.S. Intergovernmental Commission on Corporations and is sponsored by Deputy Herbert Levy.
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mation relating to its activities with the intent to make it impossible
to determine whether such activities are consistent with the objectives determined by the government.
5. Acts which translate as:
(a) a negative contribution to the development of the scientific
and technological capacity of the country;
(b) a resort to restrictive practices recognized as disloyal competition or abuse of economic power; and
(c) a disrespect for the social and cultural identity of the country.
Practice of any of these acts subjects a corporation to the sanctions of
loss of fiscal incentives, government intervention, cancellation of its
right to operate in Brazil, or expropriation of a controlling block of its
shares.
The basic difficulty with the Multinational Ethics bill is its
vagueness. If a company seeks to have its government espouse its claim
of expropriation, has it violated the first clause? If the corporation
promotes good trade relations between Brazil and its home country,
has it violated clause 2? If a parent corporation refuses a request from
the Brazilian government to convert its Brazilian subsidiary's debt
into equity investment, has it violated clause 3? If a corporation
refuses to disclose its marketing strategy or reveal its pricing policies,
has it violated clause 4? Does refusal to start a research laboratory in
Brazil because it will duplicate research being performed elsewhere
for the corporation violate clause 5(a)? Does a corporation have to be
convicted of violating Brazil's antitrust laws in order to violate 5(b)?
Would corporate sponsorship of a scholarly article critical of Brazilian
policy violate clause 5(c)? Obviously, the answers to such questions
depend upon how the regulations are drafted and how the measure is
administered. In typical Brazilian fashion, this kind of bill proposes to
grant untrammeled discretion to the bureaucracy to do justice to its
friends and apply the law punitively to its enemies.
A variety of other bills currently under consideration give some
indication of what can be expected in the near future. One drafted
under the auspices of the Ministry of Health would bar government
entities from making any health services contracts with a foreign
controlled firm, and would also prevent any foreign controlled firm
from entering the health care services field in Brazil without special
permission from the President of the Republic.97 A bill proposed by
Olavo Setibal would require that all foreign investment be in nominative form and that all foreign controlled companies be obliged to

97. Bus.

LAT. AM.,

May 14, 1980, at 155.
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publish certified balance sheets in the same form that the Securities
Commission (CVM) now requires from publicly held corporations. 98
The Industry and Commerce Ministry has proposed a bill to
create a watchdog agency to screen foreign investment and to police
the activities of foreign companies, defined to include all companies in
which as little as 25 % of the stock is in foreign hands. Although this
bill has been killed for the time being, the Ministry is reportedly
considering legislation that would spell out the areas in which foreign
investment would be either welcome or prohibited. 9
It is quite unlikely that Brazil will slam the door on foreign
investment. Brazil needs the roughly U.S.$2 billion capital inflow,
and even more important, the inputs of foreign technology, and it will
continue to need them for the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, Brazil
wants to encourage foreign investment on its own terms. Under a
democratically elected government, major changes in the Profit Remittance Law are unlikely. On the other hand, creation of a watchdog agency to police and screen out all undesirable new foreign
investments is a likely possibility.
INPI and Normative Act No. 15 will probably be retained unless
Brazil begins to fail to attract the latest technology. The pattern of
reserving an increasing number of markets to Brazilian controlled
firms will surely continue. One would expect to see statutes enacted
requiring the gradual fade out of companies already doing business in
areas that nationalist sentiment deems properly restricted to Brazilian
firms. Another likely possibility is legislation giving Brazilian capital a
right of first refusal prior to take over of a Brazilian-owned company
by a foreigner. 00 Access to Brazilian credit and capital markets by
foreign controlled companies is likely to be even more restricted. A
more nationalist government is also likely to compel multinationals to
capitalize all loans to their Brazilian subsidiaries.
A large-scale wave of nationalization or expropriation of foreign
investment is most unlikely. Such action would involve confrontations
with the international community and would run contrary to Brazil's
historic attitudes toward foreign investment. Moreover, little foreign
investment currently remains in highly sensitive areas, such as public
utilities. A continuation of the present tendency towards tight regula98. Jornal do Brasil, Je. 1, 1980.
99. Bus. LAT. AM., May 27, 1981, at 161.
100. In 1975 a decree-law requiring prior approval of the Finance Ministry before
a foreign firm could acquire a domestic firm was drafted but never published in the
Diirio Oficial. The CVM is presently able to block any takeover it deems prejudicial
to national interests.
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tion, tempered by practicality and ad hoc negotiated solutions, is
much more likely.
A democratic regime would be more concerned about income
redistribution and the quality of human life. The compulsory loan is
apt to be replaced with a progressive income tax on capital gains.101
Income tax rates on corporate income should rise from the basic 35%
rate to.about 45%, and the present excess profits surtax of 5% will
probably be retained. Progressive income tax rates on individuals may
well rise, pushing the top bracket of 55 % to about 70 %. The inheri-

tance tax is likely to be stiffened to try to break up some of the huge
family fortunes. The proceeds of these increased taxes will probably
be redistributed to those on the lower end of the economic spectrum
through increases in governmental expenditures for health and education and subsidized food and housing. The outdated, paternalistic
Consolidated Labor Laws is a prime candidate for the scrapheap.
Labor should win a less qualified right to strike, more independent
unions, and greater real wage gains. It is doubtful, however, that
labor will be able to resuscitate the old tenure system, which worked
so badly in practice. More environmental regulation appears certain,
which means businesses can expect to allocate more resources for
pollution control devices. The pace of land reform will also be stepped
up, but little significant agrarian reform will result from the new Tax
on Rural Territorial Property (ITR: Imposto sobre a Propriedade
Territorial Rural). 102
A second scenario would be for the present regime to lose control
of the economy, or that President Figueiredo's health may prevent
him from completing his term, 0 1 setting the stage for a center-right
authoritarian regime to restore economic order. Such an authoritarian
regime could conceivably adopt the Chilean model and dismantle
Brazil's elaborate set of economic controls. A substantial number of
government agencies, such as INPI and CIP, would be consigned to
the scrapheap. Wages would be reduced in real terms, and labor
101. The Secretary of Federal Revenue has reportedly already prepared several
drafts of such a bill, which is expected to be promulgated in 1981. Jornal do
Com6rcio, Apr. 18, 1980, at 1.
102. Law No. 6,476 of Dec. 10, 1979, as regulated by Decree No. 84,685 of May
6, 1980. This law imposes 22 different tax rates upon the assessed value of raw land,
varying from 0.2% to 3.5% in accordance with size. These rates can be reduced by
as much as 90%, depending upon productivity and the percentage of the tract in
productive use.
103. Figueiredo suffered a heart attack in September 1981. Unlike 1968, when
President Costa e Silva suffered a stroke, the Brazilian military permitted Vice
President Chaves, a civilian, to stand in for the convalescing president. President
Figueiredo resumed his office in November 1981.
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peace would be insured by repressive measures. The welcome mat for
foreign investment would be stretched out full length. The exchange
rate would be allowed to float freely, and tariff barriers would be
sharply reduced. Competition would replace agency rules and discretion as the basic regulatory device.
The chances of Brazil's adopting the Chilean model seem slight.
The bureaucracy is a huge source of employment, and the notion that
business requires close regulation is deeply rooted in Brazil. It is more
likely that a center-right authoritarian regime would retain the existing controls while instituting a more orthodox stabilization policy.
A third scenario is that a leftist nationalist regime will come to
power. The vehicle might be a coup from nationalist leftist elements
of the military or from populist-military alliance. An alternative vehicle might be the democratic election of a populist candidate. Such a
regime would almost surely change the basic rules governing foreign
investment. In such event, an obvious starting point would be to
revert to the 1962 version of the Profit Remittance Law, which denied
use of reinvested earnings to build up the remittance base. One would
also expect to see the percentage of earnings remittable without the
supplementary tax fall from 12 % to the 8 %-10 % range. Restrictions
upon technology transfer would be tightened further, and the payment of royalties might be prohibited altogether. The few banks
presently owned by foreign companies would probably be nationalized, upon payment of at least partial compensation.
A leftist regime might seek to reschedule Brazil's huge foreign
debt or perhaps default on part of it. Given the size of the debt,
foreign banks would probably be inclined to be quite flexible with
regard to rescheduling. But it is hard to see Brazil, even under a leftist
regime, cutting itself off completely from the Eurodollar market.
A leftist regime would probably squeeze the business community
between price controls and massive wage increases. One would expect
to see a rash of strikes, a decline in labor productivity, and an increase
in governmental subsidies. The number of state controlled firms
would increase. The risk contracts under which foreign oil firms have
been prospecting for oil would, no doubt, be terminated,, and foreign
controlled firms would probably be forced out of all mining and
energy ventures.
The first scenario seems the most likely. Even if Delfim does not
pull off another miracle and has to ask to reschedule the foreign debt
and institute austerity measures, it is doubtful that either a popular

uprising or a coup d'itat will occur. The present regime appears to be
sufficiently skillful politically to avert either action.

BRAZILIAN REGULATIONS OF BUSINESS
CONCLUSION

There is a kernel of truth in the familiar adage: "Brazil progresses
at night when the politicians sleep." The idea underlying this adage is
that it is the politicians who produce the vast amount of laws and
regulations that impede productive economic activity; consequently,
progress occurs only when this vast regulatory apparatus they have
created is asleep. In the past two decades Brazil has obviously made
great strides toward becoming a modern, urban, industrialized, developed nation. While some of this progress is undoubtedly attributable to sensible laws and policies adopted by the modernizing military
regimes that have governed the country since April 1964, some is also
attributable to the skillful circumvention of the excessive government
regulation, part of which was inherited by the military and part of
which it has created. What Brazil urgently needs is to clarify and
simplify a set of ground rules for business activity and to adhere to
those rules for a lengthy period of time. Brazil also needs a strong
commitment to deregulation and to the dismantling of large parts of
its bloated bureaucracy. Helio Beltrdo's debureaucratization program
is on the right track. A greater commitment of resources and manpower to support this imaginative but slender program should be a
high priority. Were the government truly to remove itself from the
backs of the Brazilian people, the dynamism of the economy and the
industriousness of the people are likely to produce a dazzling and
self-sustaining "miracle."

